Antebellum Perspectives on Free Speech by Graber, Mark A.
William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 3 Article 6
Antebellum Perspectives on Free Speech
Mark A. Graber
Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj
Repository Citation
Mark A. Graber, Antebellum Perspectives on Free Speech, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 779 (2002),
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol10/iss3/6
ANTEBELLUM PERSPECTIVES ON FREE SPEECH
Mark A. Graber"
In his book, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege": Struggles for
Freedom of Expression in American History, Professor Michael Kent Curtis
documents the political struggles over free speech rights that took place between
the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. Professor Curtis looks to these earlyfree speech fights to help
define the contours of contemporary speech rights. In this review, Professor Mark
A. Graber discusses Professor Curtis's contribution to constitutional history, and
the implications of The People's Darling Privilegefor constitutional theorists.
INTRODUCTION
Reviewers adopt one of three strategies when commenting on pathbreaking
works in their field. The first strategy, after a few perfunctory words of praise,
purports to state the central thesis better than the author. When successful, this
tactic enables the reviewer to claim some credit for that thesis, particularly if the
review contains subtle hints that the reviewer has also published important works
on that subject matter. "Although the Torah offers ten commandments," such a
review might assert, "the first is really extraneous and 'thou shalt not kill' might be
more clear had the author declared 'thou shalt not murder. "" The second strategy,
after a few perfunctory words of praise, purports to identify the most minute flaws
that exist in the text. When successful, this tactic demonstrates the reviewer's
superior scholarly credentials, or at least establishes the humanity of the author of
the book under review. "The Torah," a review in this spirit might proclaim,
"provides the best extent account of creation, but readers will be frustrated by the
lack of documentation for claims that people lived very long lives and put off by
repeated accounts of dysfunctional families." The third strategy, after a few
perfunctory words of praise, purports to outline the book the author really should
have written. When successful, this tactic demonstrates that the reviewer is the
* Professor of Government and Politics, University of Maryland at College Park. A.B.
1978, Dartmouth College; J.D. 1981, Columbia University; Ph.D. 1988, Yale University.
The appropriate footnote would declare:
For a more rigorous statement of some of the themes explored in Genesis, see
JEROME DAVID FRANK & JULIA B. FRANK, PERSUASION AND HEALING: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (3d ed. 1991) (discussing issues
associated with morale, a central issue in many sibling relationships discussed
in the Torah); Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy
and the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL REs. Q. 221 (1998) (discussing myths
of origin as they relate to the origins of judicial review in the United States).
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scholar responsible for the important insights on the subject matter of the book
under review. "The Torah," a review published by the American Political Science
Review would probably declare, "contains wonderfully spiritual insights, but what
is really interesting and not developed by the author are the important public choice
implications of the Exodus story."
This review of Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege ": Struggles for
Freedom of Expression in American History' adopts the third strategy by briefly
exploring some facets of Jacksonian constitutional practice and theory beyond the
scope of that work. One of the above three strategies is called for because Professor
Michael Kent Curtis of the Wake Forest University School of Law has written the
seminal study of free speech law and practice before and immediately after the Civil
War. His work deserves more than a. few perfunctory words of praise for
documenting the controversies over political expression that excited Americans
from 1787 to 1868, demonstrating that a powerful strand of antebellum thought was
committed to providing broad protection for political dissenters,' detailing how this
popular support for free speech largely coexisted with a legal tradition that
interpreted constitutional protections for free speech narrowly,4 and firmly
establishing that the persons responsible for the post-Civil War Constitution
intended to prevent state officials from violating free speech rights.5 The first two
strategies for cutting pathbreaking works down to mortal size are doomed to failure.
The People's Darling Privilege defies all reviewing efforts to improve the book the
author actually wrote by restating central themes more clearly and better
highlighting their significance. Curtis is a brilliant storyteller. His free speech
narratives will benefit scholars who read for business and history buffs who read
for fun. The prose is clear, the tales fascinating. Hunting for minute flaws in The
People's Darling Privilege serves no useful purpose,6 and, given the prodigious
research Professor Curtis has done on antebellum free speech fights, is more likely
to reveal the reviewer's ignorance. The third strategy is more promising for the
simple reason that no book covers a subject matter from every conceivable
perspective. The People's Darling Privilege studies free speech in antebellum
constitutional politics primarily to learn more about free speech. Free speech in
antebellum constitutional politics might also be studied to learn more about
antebellum constitutional politics. Such a perspective yields complementary,
though hardly more important, insights than those found throughout Curtis's work.
2 MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE":
STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000).
1 See id. at 52-356.
4 See id.
5 See id. at 357-83.
6 Readers mayjudge for themselves, however, whether the bright red background of the
inside book jacket makes the text harder to read.
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This review explores the book Curtis might have written had he been interested
in locating the free speech fights documented by The People's Darling Privilege in
the broader context of Jacksonian constitutional politics. The book Curtis did not
write would emphasize that Jacksonian America was a place where most
constitutional controversies were fought outside of courts. Numerous gulfs existed
before the Civil War between existing judicial precedent and actual political
practice. The popular free speech tradition that developed during the first sixty
years of the nineteenth century was not an exceptional constitutional development,
but the dominant mode of constitutional discourse in a society where, with
apologies to Tocqueville, "[s]carcely any political [or constitutional] question
ar[ose]... that [was] ... resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question."7 This
revised study of free speech practice in antebellum America would further highlight
how Jacksonians attached the same, if not more, constitutional significance to
legislative and executive decisions on constitutional matters as contemporary
Americans attach tojudicial decisions on constitutional matters. The constitutional
politics of the 1840s and 1850s suggest that constitutional questions before the Civil
War were more often settled outside the courts than by judicial decree.'
This Jacksonian understanding of popular constitutionalism structured how the
antebellum popular free speech tradition influenced the post-Civil War Constitution.
The book Curtis wrote demonstrates that Republicans were committed to ensuring
that state governments would not violate free speech rights as those rights were
understood in the popular free speech tradition that had supported antislavery
7 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Alfred A. Knopf 1994)
(1835).
8 A review this author did not write (except as part of a footnote!) would explore the
distinctive intellectual and jurisprudential justifications of free speech in the United States.
Contemporary democratic relativists make sharp distinctions between claims that free speech
will lead to truth and claims that free speech is a central element of the democratic process.
See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
7-11 (1966). For the influence of democratic relativism on twentieth century free speech
theory, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 165-67 (1991); ROGERS M.
SMrH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 99-119 (1985). For a more
general discussion of democratic relativism and democratic theory, see EDWARD A.
PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 205-10 (1973). Nineteenth century
libertarians were not democratic relativists. Democratic processes were valuable precisely
because they were the best means for discovering the truth. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 2,
at 414 (quoting Freedom of Discussion, BOSTON ADVOC., Jan. 3, 1838). I suspect no
antebellum proponent of broad free speech rights would claim that "in a world in which
there [are] no objective values, but only personal preferences, the politically and legally
'right' or 'rational' could only be defined as whatever the democratic process ground out."
Martin Shapiro, Recent Developments in Political Jurisprudence, 36 W. POL. Q. 541, 543
(1983).
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advocacy before the Civil War.' The book Curtis did not write explains why
Republicans fought for a constitutional amendment that required state governments
to respect the liberties set out in the First Amendment, while not seeking an
amendment rejecting the common legal view that those liberties largely consisted
of a freedom from prior restraints.' The way Republicans amended the constitution
makes sense only on the antebellum assumption that sixty years of political practice
outside of the courts had established that the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were
unconstitutional.
Contemporary constitutionalists should consider reviving those Jacksonian
practices which attached constitutional significance to all settlements of
constitutional questions, without regard to the political fora where the settlement
took place. Present practices that privilege judicial precedents are unduly biased
in favor of state power. Courts usually consider the constitutional limits on state
power only when state officials take some constitutionally controversial action, such
as passing a law many persons claim violates the First Amendment. During times
when political institutions are controlled by proponents of limited national powers,
measures that some persons claim violate constitutional rights are either defeated
or not debated. To the extent courts generally support dominant national values, a
court staffed with proponents of broad free speech rights is less likely to adjudicate
free speech claims than a court staffed with proponents of narrower free speech
rights. The political coalitions most likely to staff the federal judiciary with persons
who interpret constitutional rights broadly are also the political coalitions least
likely to pass legislation inconsistent with a broad understanding of free speech.
Giving equal status to all decisions influenced by the constitutional meaning of free
speech ensures libertarian movements that protect expression rights will have the
same enduring constitutional value as less libertarian movements that limit
expression rights.
I. THE BOOK PROFESSOR CURTIS WROTE
The People's Darling Privilege uses remarkably original constitutional history
for fairly conventional constitutional purposes. Curtis has written the first detailed
account of the major free speech fights that took place in the United States from
1787 to 1868, and the first work that documents the powerful strand of libertarian
thought that developed during those years. His historiography is as original as his
history. The People's Darling Privilege emphasizes how the American polity as a
whole understood free speech rights. That narrative details how prominent political
actors before, during, and immediately after the Civil War interpreted the First
9 See CURTIS, supra note 2, at 358.
10 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 151 ("The liberty of the press...
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications .... ).
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Amendment. Curtis appropriately avoids the too often standard practice that largely
confines constitutional history to judicial pronouncements and legal commentary.
This novel constitutional history and novel understanding of what counts as
constitutional history have conventional constitutional purposes. The lessons The
People's Darling Privilege teaches are the legal and instructive lessons that law
professors who write constitutional history have traditionally taught. The popular
free speech tradition in the nineteenth century, Curtis maintains, supports
interpreting the twenty-first century Constitution as protecting broad free speech
rights." His work offers legal evidence that the persons responsible for the
Constitution of 1868 intended to forbid state laws repressing speech analogous to
antislavery advocacy, and pragmatic evidence that contemporary Americans should
not restrict speech analogous to antislavery advocacy. 2
A. The Story
The People's Darling Privilege details the rich antebellum tradition of free
speech thought and debate that Professor Curtis has unearthed in this volume and
in previous articles.'3 Recent scholarship had demonstrated that the American free
speech tradition did not begin when the Supreme Court, in the wake of World War
I, began considering the extent to which the Constitution permitted state and federal
officials to outlaw political dissent.'4 Significant political controversies over free
" CURTIS, supra note 2, at 429.
2 d. at 362-68.
' See Michael Kent Curtis, Critics of "Free Speech" and the Uses of the Past, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 29 (1995); Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and
Life After Death: The Privileges or Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L.
REv. 1071 (2000); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti- War Speech in
the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 105 (1998); Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting
the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-House Cases Without
Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REV. 1
(1996); Michael Kent Curtis, Teaching Free Speech from an Incomplete Fossil Record, 34
AKRON L. REv. 231 (2000) [hereinafter Curtis, TeachingFree Speech]; Michael Kent Curtis,
The 1837 Killing of Elijah Lovejoy by an Anti-Abolition Mob: Free Speech, Mobs,
Republican Government, and the Privileges of American Citizens, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1109
(1997); Michael Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impending
Crisis: Free Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1113 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, The
Curious History ofAttempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, andPetition in 1835-37,
89 Nw. U. L. REv. 785 (1995).
'" See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (upholding a conviction under
the Espionage Act of 1917 for circulating flyers critical of the war and the draft); Debs v.
United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (upholding a conviction for a speech criticizing the U.S.
role in World War I); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction
for circulating leaflets supporting revolution in allied Russia); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
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speech occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Those
controversies provoked extensive scholarly commentary on the scope of
constitutional protections for expression rights."5 The People's Darling Privilege
completes the story, demonstrating that the American free speech tradition is
coextensive with the American constitutional tradition. Free speech controversies
have occurred at every period in American history. Each generation of Americans
has experienced a sustained political effort to restrict advocacy of certain policies
and an equally vigorous response to defend the free speech rights of political
dissenters.
The free speech fights of one political era can be understood only in light of the
struggles over political dissent fought in the previous political era. The means
chosen by the Jacksonians to repress antislavery speech in the 1830s were partly
determined by the broad social consensus that had developed after 1800 that the
Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional." Republican efforts to amend the
Constitution after the Civil War were significantly influenced by the outcomes of
the controversies over free speech that took place before the Civil War.'
Curtis deserves special credit for documenting the powerful libertarian strands
in antebellum constitutional thought. The American libertarian tradition, The
People 's DarlingPrivilege demonstrates, dates from the eighteenth century, and did
not begin with either Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissent inAbrams v. United
States, 8 or the conservative libertarian treatises of the late nineteenth century.'9
"Between the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791 and ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1868," Curtis details, "American citizens - activists,
newspaper editors, ministers, lawyers, and politicians - developed and expanded
a protective, popular free speech tradition."' His work establishes the credentials
Elijah Lovejoy and John Quincy Adams have for a permanent place in the pantheon
of free speech heroes: as activists who fought at great risk for the right to dissent.2 '
When defending free speech, these and other antebellum Americans relied on
general principles that remain vibrant at present and proved willing to interpret
652 (1925) (upholding conviction under state law for publishing a socialist manifesto).
"5 See GRABER, supra note 8; DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN
YEARS (1997); see also MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS: FREEDOM
OF EXPRESSION IN MODERN AMERICA 3-70 (1992); NORMAN L. ROSENBERG, PROTECTING
THE BEST MEN: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF THE LAW OF LIBEL (1986).
16 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 136-54.
17 Id. at 360-62.
IS 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
19 E.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONALLIMrrATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (photo.
reprint 1998) (5th ed. 1883); see also GRABER, supra note 8, at 17-49.
20 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 4.
21 Id. at 177-80,216-17.
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constitutional protections for expression rights as broadly as any contemporary civil
libertarian.
The People's Darling Privilege advances the recent scholarly tendency to
highlight the significance of constitutional debate outside the courts.2" American
constitutional development, Curtis and others remind us, is not a synonym for
American judicial development. Antebellum debates over free speech have gone
under contemporary legal radars because they took place almost entirely within
legislative, executive, or electoral fora. Congress debated whether to receive
antislavery petitions and whether antislavery literature was mailable. The attorney
general in 185 7 determined that a deputy postmaster need not deliver an abolitionist
newspaper if its distribution was prohibited under local law.23 Federal courts did
not confront the relationship between the First Amendment and the postal power
until the end of Reconstruction.24
This focus on the speech fights that took place in the elected branches of
government highlights how, before and immediately after the Civil *War,
constitutional practice outside of the courts was far more libertarian than
constitutional practice inside the courts. Curtis notes that "a chasm between the
orthodox understanding of the right [to free speech] many judges would apply and
the popular right many citizens exercised and thought they had., 25 Late eighteenth
and nineteenth century judges rarely distinguished themselves by protecting
political dissent.26 Political advocacy thrived only when proponents of free speech
won legislative and popular struggles. "[T]he popular view of free speech," which
"grew up outside the courts (and often contradicted judicial doctrine)," Curtis
declares, "had real-world effects - in elections, in legislatures, for at least some
judges, and in actions by government officials." '27 The Sedition Act may have been
' The seminal work in this literature is SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH
(1988). Other important works include SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTrrUTIONAL
AUTHORITY (1992); NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (1996); LouiS
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONALDIALOGUES (1988); WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONALRIGHTS
AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1996); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTiTUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
(1999); Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. POL 406 (1986).
23 Yazoo City Post Office Case, 8 Op. Att'y Gen. 489 (1857).
24 Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
25 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 3-4; see also id. at 12 ("The popular free speech and press
tradition compares well with the stunted and crabbed view of free speech articulated by some
judges and some commentators from the founding until the 1930s.').
26 See id. at 8 ("From the Sedition Act through the Civil War... courts were too often
hostile to dissenting speech when it was under attack."); id. at 9 ("Strong judicial protection
of speech is ... comparatively recent .... For much of American history ... many judges
have been less protective of free speech.").
27 Id. at 4.
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sustained by Supreme Court justices on circuit, but those measures were
"repudiated in the election of 1800... [and] [fjrom 1800 to 1860, most politicians
treated the act as unconstitutional .... . 28 Elected officials and citizens proved
more receptive than judges to free speech arguments made immediately before the
Civil War. Curtis points out that "[i]n the Northern states, serious legal incursions
on abolitionist speech, press, or petition were checked, not by courts, but by citizens
urging a broadly protective understanding of free speech." '29
B. The Moral
The People's Darling Privilege is written from the perspective of a law
professor committed to protecting free speech and other fundamental rights. The
lessons Curtis would have readers draw from his narrative are that fundamental
liberties are sometimes better protected outside the courtroom than by judicial
officials," that the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
was almost certainly understood in 1868 as banning state violations of First
Amendment rights,3 and that many present proposals for restricting speech
unwittingly rely on theories used before the Civil War to justify repressing
antislavery advocacy. 2 The constitutional history of free speech teaches these
lessons because nineteenth century battles for expression rights were fought over
the same terrain as contemporary struggles for expression rights. Curtis is primarily
interested in such "recurrent free speech issues" as "[w]ould free speech be a
national right of all Americans," and "[c]ould fear that speech ... had a 'bad
tendency' to cause serious harm justify suppressing it?"'33 The introduction to The
People's Darling Privilege proclaims: "The Sedition Act debate and later
[antebellum] free speech struggles implicate... issues that run through the story of
free speech in the United States ....
These important presentist goals hardly make The People's Darling Privilege
a work of legal advocacy or law office history.35 Curtis meticulously details the bad
as well as the good. Both the Alien and Sedition Acts and Lincoln's suppression
of speech opposing the Civil War, Curtis freely acknowledges, are as much a part
2 Id. at 5.
'9 Id. at 6.
30 See CURTIS, supra note 2, at 21.
31 See id. at 19.
32 See id. at 432.
3 Id. at 2.
14 Id. at 5.
3' For the accepted jeremiads against law office history, see Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and
the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Cr. REv. 119, 122 n.13, 125-32; Martin S.
Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523
(1995).
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of the American free speech tradition as John Quincy Adams's successful fight
against the gag rule.36 Still, the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1868
learned certain lessons from the free speech fights of the past. The lessons they
learned have present significance on their own merits and because they were
embodied in legal texts still regarded as fundamental."
Using constitutional history to privilege particular interpretations of the
Constitution is a conventional legal practice. Most of the best works on
constitutional history written by contemporary academic lawyers conclude that past
practices provide powerful legal support for specific constitutional doctrines or
practices. Akhil Reed Amar, in his acclaimed The Bill of Rights, tells "a tale that
* . . ends up supporting most of today's precedent about the Bill of Rights."38
"[T]his book," Amar declares in his last sentence, "has aimed to explain how
today's judges and lawyers have often gotten it right without quite realizing why."'39
Michael McConnell analyzes Reconstruction debates at great length to prove that
Brown v. Board of Education0 was consistent with the original intentions of the
persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Bruce Ackerman has
famously turned to history to establish a theory of constitutional amendment outside
of Article V, 2
Other constitutional histories emphasize the instructive functions of history.
The past, in this view, demonstrates the practical and normative superiority of a
particular constitutional choice. Lucas Powe's seminal history of broadcast
regulation concludes that Americans ought not to interpret the First Amendment as
permitting government "regulation of broadcasting" because "abuses" of
36 CURTIS, supra note 2,passim.
" The People's Darling Privilege and other recent works by eminent law professors
demonstrate that academic lawyers are as capable as other scholars of producing
distinguished historical scholarship, even when that scholarship has a presentist point. See,
e.g., RABBAN, supra note 7; Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary
Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1998); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial
Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997). Indeed, as noted below,
virtually all historical scholarship has apresentistpoint. See supra text accompanying notes.
38 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 307
(1998) [hereinafter AMAR, THEBILLOFRIGHTS]. Amar's THECONSTITUTION ANDCRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES similarly looks to history to provide legal standards for
interpreting the Constitution. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES x (1997) (using history to highlight "the need to construe the
Constitution in ways that protect the innocent without needlessly advantaging the guilty").
39 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 307.
40 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"' Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L.
REv. 947 (1995).
42 BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE 44-57 (1991).
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government licensing "have occurred with unfortunate frequency. 43 David
Rabban's wonderful Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years concludes by suggesting
that his history of free speech fights in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century discredits present arguments for limiting expression rights. Contemporary
calls for banning hate speech and other forms of expression, Rabban writes, "bear[]
strong, although largely unacknowledged, parallels to arguments made by
progressive intellectuals in the decade immediately preceding World War One."
Cass Sunstein uses the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford' as an
example of what happens when justices fail to decide cases on the narrowest
possible grounds.'
Non-lawyers are hardly immune to this genre. My Rethinking Abortion used
history to provide legal and pragmatic reasons for keeping abortion legal.47 Philip
Klinkner and Rogers Smith conclude their history of racial equality in the United
States by detailing the lessons they believe past practices teach about present
policy.4 Just as Curtis believes that certain "recurrent issues" structure all free
speech fights, so Klinkner and Smith believe that "three factors... have thus far
always been present when the United States has made strides toward greater racial
justice. 49 Virtually any political or policy argument about the future must assume
some continuity with the past. We cannot plan for a future that will be radically
different from the past. Policymakers must assume that certain crucial features of
the past have relatively enduring elements that will structure future debate.
Curtis uses history in both legal and instructive senses when defending free
speech. His first book offered what are increasingly regarded as compelling reasons
for thinking that the persons responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment intended
to prohibit states from violating the liberties set out in the Bill of Rights.5" The
People's Darling Privilege provides more evidence for this historical claim about
the meaning of the crucial constitutional provisions. Curtis details how the
Reconstruction sponsors of the post-Civil War Constitution were particularly
43 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6
(1987).
44 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 381 (1997).
41 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
46 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Dred Scott v. Sandford and Its Legacy, in GREAT CASES
iN CONSTrnMONAL LAW (Robert P. George ed., 2000).
41 MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUALCHOICE, THE CONSTrIUTION, AND
REPRODUCTIVE POLrnCS (1996).
48 PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALrTY IN AMERICA 317-51 (1999).
41 Id. at 317. The three factors are: (1) an enemy identified as committed to racially
inegalitarian or undemocratic practices; (2) the need to draft persons of color to fight that
enemy; and (3) a strong movement for civil rights. Id.
so MICHAELKENTCURTiS, NO STATE SHALLABRIDGE: THEFOURTEENTHAMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986).
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concerned with providing constitutional guarantees that would prevent the
repression of antislavery and analogous speech that had taken place in the
antebellum South."' He documents how antislavery advocates framed the post-Civil
War Constitution in light of the harassment and censorship they had experienced
in Jacksonian America. Such persons as John Bingham, who had endorsed Hinton
Helper's The Impending Crisis of the South 2 in 1858,"3 thought that the new
Constitution more firmly protected the right to publish that tract. The problem with
the antebellum Constitution, in this view, was that states had no obligation to
protect such fundamental rights as free speech or, at least, the popular
understanding supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore'
was that states had no national constitutional obligation to protect such fundamental
rights as free speech. Republicans corrected this omission or ambiguity by more
clearly writing into the Constitution a requirement that states respect fundamental
rights. 55
The main thrust of The People's Darling Privilege is instructive. "[F]ree
speech struggles over slavery," Curtis believes, "help us to evaluate other
suppression theories." 6 He uses history to convince readers that free speech should
protect all arguments analogous to "the claim that slavery is a cruel and evil
institution that should be abandoned."5' His next to last chapter points out that
various arguments used to limit speech at present could be and were previously used
to suppress antislavery advocacy. Persons who would deny to adults literature that
children should not read rely on the same premises used to deny to (white) citizens
literature (black) slaves should not read.5 ' The last pages of The People's Darling
Privilege conclude, "[o]nce we understand the abuses of power that prompted the
free speech tradition, we can better understand the risk of abandoning it." '59
. The instructive and legal arguments in The People's Darling Privilege do not
have quite the same thrust. The instructive arguments explain why no governmental
official should restrict speech analogous to antislavery advocacy. The legal
arguments explain only why no state official should restrict speech analogous to
antislavery speech. The Fourteenth Amendment, as the title of Curtis's first book
makes clear, declares that "no state may abridge." Nothing in The People's Darling
51 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 358-64.
52 HINTON ROWAN HELPER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS OF THE SOUTH: How TO MEET IT
(George M. Fredrickson ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (1857).
" Curtis, Teaching Free Speech, supra note 13, at 253.
54 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
55 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 6-7 (discussing how the Fourteenth Amendment makes the
Bill of Rights applicable to the states).
16 Id. at 7.
57 Id. at 384.
58 Id. at 402-03; see id. at 384-413 (reviewing historical bases for suppression).
51 Id. at 436.
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Privilege or constitutional history suggests that the persons responsible for the post-
Civil War Constitution thought they were amending the First Amendment.
This failure to amend the First Amendment creates several puzzles. To the
extent a legal tradition existed that interpreted constitutional protections for free
speech narrowly, Reconstruction Republicans apparently left that tradition standing,
at least as applied to the federal government. If the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to nationalize constitutional protections for free speech and the
legal tradition of narrowly protecting free speech was left standing, then
Reconstruction Republicans may have adopted a constitutional amendment that did
not protect speech analogous to antislavery advocacy. If the post-Civil War
Constitution is interpreted as requiring states to protect free speech rights as defined
by the popular free speech tradition, then the persons responsible for the Fourteenth
Amendment failed to nationalize protections for expression rights if the legal
tradition still influenced how the unchanged First Amendment should be
interpreted. These puzzles cannot be resolved within the book Professor Curtis
wrote. They require two other books, one on Jacksonian constitutional practice, the
other on constitutional theory.
11. THE BOOKS PROFESSOR CURTIS DID NOT WRITE
Two books might be written exploring the relationships between the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. The first is a work of constitutional history examining the
distinctive Jacksonian political practices that explain why Republicans thought
nationalizing the First Amendment would bar state laws repressing speech
analogous to antislavery advocacy, even though a legal tradition existed that
understood the First Amendment as not necessarily prohibiting laws repressing
antislavery advocacy. That work would detail Jacksonian understandings of
popularconstitutionalism that led Republicans to think the unconstitutionalityofthe
Alien and Sedition Acts was settled constitutional law. The second is a work of
constitutional theory exploring the justification of Jacksonian practice. That work
might note how relying on judicial precedent alone gives a false picture of those
constitutional settlements reached in any era where nonjudicial settlements have
constitutional significance.
A. The Historical Perspective
Many constitutional histories highlight what is distinctive about particular
modes of constitutional argument, or particular periods of constitutional history.
The second paragraph of my Transforming Free Speech proclaims: "The
understanding of expression rights that currently dominates scholarly debate is a
product of the political and legal thought of the progressive era and was foreign to
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the conceptions advanced by earlier defenders of free speech."' Judicial protection
of free speech at the turn of the twentieth century, I believe, was identified with
judicial protection of such individual liberties as the freedom to contract. 6' By the
middle of the twentieth century, judicial protection of free speech had become
identified primarily with judicial protection of other elements of the democratic
process such as the right to vote.62 Howard Gillman's enormously influential study
of judicial decision-making at the turn of the twentieth century emphasizes the
distinctivejurisprudential logics of a particular generation of constitutional thinkers.
"[T]he real lesson of Lochner v. New York,"' 3 he writes, "is that th[e] foundations
[of that decision] are no longer available as a basis for determining the proper role
of the judiciary in American politics." Lucas Powe similarly concludes, "a
nostalgia for the Warren Court is necessarily a nostalgia for the 1960s.'6' The
Warren Court, in his view, is best understood in terms of the distinctive political
conditions associated with the New Frontier and Great Society. 6
Constitutional histories that focus on the distinctive forms of constitutional
justification often have presentist concerns,just not the presentist concerns of those
who believe history privileges a particular constitutional decision. The standard
theme of many constitutional histories is that contemporary constitutional decision-
makers should be far more concerned with advancing present values than upholding
traditions based on discarded assumptions, abandoned political practices, or past
circumstances. "The lingering debates over the best answers to these inescapable
questions [about the judicial role] will inevitably continue," Gillman concludes,
"but they should go forward unfettered by the fanciful claim that our burden is to
rediscover ancient answers rather than forge agreement on the answers that seem
best for us."'6 Jack Rakove reaches the same conclusion at the end of his Pulitizer
Prize-winning account of the framing and ratification struggles. "Having learned
so much from the experience of a mere decade of self-government, and having
celebrated their own ability to act from 'reflection and choice,"' he writes, "would
[the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1787] not find the idea that later
generations could not improve upon their discoveries incredible?" ' Transforming
Free Speech concludes: "Contemporary libertarians will be true to our actual First
Amendment tradition only if we also transform free speech so that our theories
60 GRABER, supra note 8, at 1-2.
6 See id.,at 17-49.
62 See id. at 122-64.
63 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
64 HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED 305 (1993).
65 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 501 (2000).
66Id.
67 GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 205.
61 JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS 367 (1996).
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reflect the values we cherish and respond to the threats we face." 9
Highlighting the distinctive features of previous constitutional debates may also
illuminate contemporary constitutional debates by highlighting the political,
intellectual, jurisprudential, and sociological explanations for discontinuities
between past and present. Sometimes these discontinuities make impossible
recovery of past constitutional meanings. To the extent that "[i]ndustrialization
undermined the social foundations that supported" Supreme Court decision making
at the turn of the twentieth century,7" Americans at the turn of the twenty-first
century cannot coherently champion the freedom of contract in its pristine form.
Historical research, however, may reveal alternative ways of conceptualizing the
constitutional universe that are at least partly recoverable in our time. Recognizing
how Jacksonians settled constitutional controversies outside of courts hardly
compels contemporary Americans to adopt those or related practices. Nevertheless,
understanding the Jacksonian foundations of antebellum free speech debates may
enable citizens to think more creatively about present constitutional practices.
B. The Story
Scholars more interested in distinctive antebellum practices than an enduring
free speech tradition would use the struggles over antislavery advocacy to spin a
different narrative than the story told by The People's Darling Privilege. Curtis
describes the tip of an iceberg when he highlights the existence of a popular free
speech tradition that existed entirely outside of the courts. With the exception of
a few issues associated with slavery, virtually all the major constitutional questions
that arose in Jacksonian America were not resolved into judicial questions." l Keith
Whittington has recently documented the extensive debates over the
constitutionality of the tariff that were largely confined to the executive and
legislative branches of the federal and state governments.72 Few Americans know
that many prominent northerners insisted that Texas was unconstitutionally annexed
to the United States.73 Antebellum Americans more generally engaged in wide-
69 GRABER, supra note 8, at 234. Curtis recognizes "the difficulty of applying nineteenth
century ideas in a twenty-first century world." CURTIS, supra note 2, at 415. Many present
challenges to a healthy system of free expression grow out of forms of business organization
that were at most nascent in antebellum America. Id. Still, the emphasis in The People's
Darling Privilege is on how the past privileges certain policy choices, rather than on how
adherence to the past is unduly narrowly present political thinking.
70 GIL.MAN, supra note 64, at 203.
7' Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions: Tocqueville's
Thesis Revisited 47-53 (Sept. 2000) (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Convention) (on file with the author).
72 WHriINGTON, supra note 22, at 93-96.
73 See FREDERICK MERK, SLAVERY AND THE ANNEXATION OF TEXAS 126 (1972).
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ranging constitutional debates without any sense that they were stepping on a
distinctive judicial province.'
Jacksonian America was a place where popular practice protected many rights
that legal practice denied. "There were any number of instances during th[is]
period[] [before the Civil War]," John Dinan writes, "when legislators, judges,
convention delegates, or citizens preferred a policy on its merits but refrained from
taking action because to do so would have violated regime principles." This
protective popular tradition may have been linked to the narrow legal tradition.
Dinan believes that "[a]lthough judges possessed the authority to overturn laws that
violated provisions of bills of rights, they generally declined to exercise this power
on the view that the protection of rights was the proper domain of the legislature."76
This analysis suggests that the popular and legal traditions before the Civil War
were institutional traditions rather than distinctive understandings of civil liberties.
Narrow judicial interpretations of rights were less assertions of what the
Constitution meant than recognitions that elected officials were primarily charged
with determining the scope of constitutional rights.
Antebellum Americans attached the same constitutional significance to
constitutional settlements reached outside of the courts as they did to constitutional
settlements inside the courts. Several important constitutional controversies in
Jacksonian American were thought resolved by decisions reached by elected
officials. When Justice McLean in T855 declared that "the settled opinion now
seems to be, that ... [C]ongress may establish post-roads extending over bridges,
but it can neither build them nor exercise any control over them," 7 his reference to
"settled opinion" did not refer to judicial opinion. No Supreme Court decision ever
ruled on whether Congress could build post roads.' The constitutional ban on
federal legislation building post roads was settled by legislative and executive
debates during the 1830s and 1840s." Whittington similarly notes that the
constitutional status of protective tariffs was settled outside of the courts. The
compromise of 1833, he documents, "achieved a binding quality that did largely
remove from politics one of the most contentious issues of the period."s
14 See DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-21 (1966).
15 JOHN J. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES 168 (1998).
76 Id.
7 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421,442 (1855)
(McLean, J., dissenting).
78 See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 166 (1845) ("[T]he constitutional power
of the general government to construct this road is not involved in the case before us; nor
is this court called upon to express any opinion upon that subject.... !).
79 See generally LINDSAY ROGERS, THE POSTAL POWER OF CONGRESS: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPANSION 61-79 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Studies in Historical & Political
Sci., Series 34, 14o. 2, 1916).
80 WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 103.
2002].
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
Antebellum Americans claimed that popular debate could settle some constitutional
decisions even in the face of a contrary Supreme Court decision. John Marshall and
his brethren unanimously declared that Congress had the power to incorporate a
national bank,"' but consistent rejection by elected officials on constitutional
grounds led Whigs in the years immediately before the Civil War to conclude that
the national bank was constitutionally "dead."82 Abraham Lincoln acknowledged
the political overruling of McCulloch when, during his sixth debate with Stephen
Douglas, the Illinois Republican declared: "Did not he and his political friends find
a way to reverse the decision of that [Supreme] Court in favor of the
constitutionality of the National Bank?" 3 The federal judiciary before the Civil
War settled issues only when, as was the case in Dred Scott v. Sandford,4 elected
officials explicitly invited the justices to settle a matter that escaped political
resolution. 5
These Constitutional practices before the Civil War explain why Republicans
amended the Constitution to nationalize protection for civil liberties rather than
ratify amendments overruling legal precedents suggesting that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were unconstitutional. What Republicans put into the new
Constitution was structured by what they believed was already in the old
Constitution. Curtis details how Republicans wrote into the new constitution legal
rules they believed were not in or were ambiguously declared by the old
Constitution. The Thirteenth Amendment was necessary because the antebellum
Constitution permitted states to legalize slavery." Section One of the Fourteenth
Amendment was necessary because the antebellum Constitution did not clearly
declare that states had no power to abridge certain fundamental rights.8 7
Republicans did not write into the new Constitution legal rules they believed were
already clearly in the old Constitution. A constitutional amendment making clear
that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional was not necessary because
Republicans regarded the unconstitutionality of those measures as settled.88 No one
during the debates over slavery suggested that the First Amendment was limited to
SI McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
82 ELBERTB. SMrrH, THE PRESIDENCIES OFZACHARY TAYLOR & MILLARD FILLMORE 41
(1988).
11 Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois (Oct. 13, 1858) in 3 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 278 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
" 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
85 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCoTrCASE 152-208 (1978); Mark A. Graber,
The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 35,46-50 (1993); Wallace Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case -Reconsidered, 38 MINN.
L. REv. 16 (1953).
86 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 17-18.
87 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
88 See MOORE, supra note 22, at 250.
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prior restraints or that the Alien and Sedition Acts passed constitutional muster.
Given that constitutional practice before the war apparently settled that the First
Amendment protected speech analogous to antislavery advocacy, the only task for
Republicans was to provide constitutional grounds for holding states to the same
standards.
Jacksonian constitutional practice provides a second reason why the post-Civil
War Constitution did not spell out the precise free speech standards that all
governing officials were obliged to protect. Contemporary Americans are inclined
to see courts as the primary protectors of fundamental rights. The language of the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment makes fairly clear that the justices are to
evaluate gender discrimination using the same standards they use to evaluate race
discrimination. 9 Many Jacksonians did not regard justices as the primary
protectors for civil liberties.9 ° Republicans certainly did not intend to vest a
national judiciary that less than a decade ago had handed down Dred Scott and was
hostile to Reconstruction9' with the primary responsibility for setting the national
standard for free speech.9" The crucial provision of the Fourteenth Amendment was
Section Five.93 That clause is best interpreted as giving the national legislature the
power to create national standards for civil liberties, rather than as simply declaring
a particular standard that Congress would enforce. "[Tihe framing generation,"
William Nelson correctly concludes, "anticipated that Congress rather than the
courts would be the principal enforcer of Section One."94 Civil liberty was
protected by giving a national government presumed sympathetic to antislavery and
analogous speech the power to determine the scope of free speech rights.
The way in which the Fourteenth Amendment nationalized free speech suggests
some caution about celebrating the civil libertarian credentials of John Bingham and
his political allies. Republicans were quite concerned about protecting their speech,
but their commitment to protecting political dissent was less apparent. Harsh
denunciation of Reconstruction was not the sort of speech analogous to antislavery
89 See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 48-52 (1986).
'o See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
9' See Exparte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867) (finding unconstitutional an act
of Congress riquiring a loyalty oath for admission to the bar); Cummings v. Missouri, 71
U.S. (4. Wall.) 277 (1867) (finding unconstitutional several provisions of a state constitution
requiring an oath of loyalty to be taken by any officer of the state, currently serving or later
appointed); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866) (granting writ of habeus corpus
to resident of non-secessionist state, arrested and tried before a military tribunal in that
state).
92 See Mark A. Graber, The Constitution as a Whole: A Partial Political Science
Perspective, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 343, 368 (1999).
93 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
94 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROMPOLrrICALPRINCIPLETO
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 122 (1988); see also Graber, supra note 58, at 367-68.
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advocacy that Republicans were willing to protect. James McCardle was convicted
for writing scathing, racist denunciations of Reconstruction,95 and kept in prison
when Congress stripped the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction necessary to hear his
appeal." Moreover, the Constitution of 1868 was likely to protect free speech only
as long as national majorities were committed to protecting free speech. When
Republicans lost both their national majority and commitment to civil liberties, the
institutional structures established after the Civil War proved incapable of securing
the rights of either political dissenters or persons of color.97
C. The Book on Constitutional Theory
The book on constitutional theory that Professor Curtis did not write explores
whether and how Jacksonian practice should influence contemporary
understandings of the relationship between the Constitution of 1787/91 and the
Constitution of 1868. Republican assumptions about what the Constitution of 1791
meant determined how they wrote the Constitution of 1868. What that Constitution
means depends partly on whether those assumptions were right or whether the
interpretive consequences of those assumptions were wrong. Given that the persons
responsible for the Fourteenth Amendment intended to nationalize the protections
set out in the Bill of Rights, to what extent do their distinctive understandings of
those rights influence how Fourteenth Amendment rights should be interpreted? If
those distinctive understandings influence how Fourteenth Amendment rights
should be interpreted, do they also affect how the original amendments in the Bill
of Rights should be interpreted, given that one purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment was to hold state governments to the same standard of rights protection
as the federal government? Did the Fourteenth Amendment change the meaning of
the First Amendment, or did the meaning of the First Amendment change sometime
between 1791 and 1868 when a political consensus developed that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were unconstitutional?
Curtis and Reconstruction Republicans offer two potentially distinctive
descriptions of the Constitution of 1868. Curtis declares: "One purpose [of the
Fourteenth Amendment] was to make guarantees of free speech national and to
require states to respect the rights set out in the First Amendment."'8 Prominent
Republicans during Reconstruction similarly declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment would prohibit states from violating "the personal rights guarantied
9 See Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts ": Revising the Domain ofFederal
Courts Jurisprudence at theEnd of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1043-44
(1994).
96 See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 512-15 (1868).
97 See Graber, supra note 92, at 369-71.
98 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 357.
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[sic] and secured by the first eight amendments of the [C]onstitution; such as the
freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."" Other passages of The
People's Darling Privilege highlight a different aspect of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Curtis maintains that the persons responsible for the Constitution of
1868 were committed to preventing certain violations of free speech that had taken
place in the past. "In the debates of 1864-66 on slavery and individual rights," he
writes, "Republicans recalled the events of 1835-60.... Congressmen recalled
mobs destroying antislavery presses and Southern laws banning antislavery speech,
press, and religion."' 00 Republicans in 1866 similarly declared that the Fourteenth
Amendment would outlaw "despotic laws" that had been passed in the South
"proscrib[ing] democratic literature as incendiary."'' These descriptions of the
postwar Constitution as requiring states to respect the First Amendment and as
banning past state restrictions on free speech can be reconciled if the First
Amendment before the Civil War barred national suppression of antislavery speech.
Republicans obviously made this assumption. Had they thought the First
Amendment merely forbade prior restraints on free speech or otherwise did not
protect antislavery speech, the text of the post-Civil War Constitution might well
have been different. Certainly, Republicans did not intend to ratify amendments
that nationalized the Bill of Rights but did not protect antislavery and analogous
speech.
Aspirational theorists need not be concerned with the potential differences
between the dominant conceptions of free speech in 1791 and the dominant
conceptions in 1868. Ronald Dworkin and others interpret most constitutional
rights provisions as guaranteeing fundamental liberties rather than as freezing
particular historical understandings. 2 Constitutional declarations of rights,
Dworkin maintains, obligate government to respect the best concept of those rights,
not any dominant conception of those rights at the time the Constitution was
ratified.0 3 Hence, constitutional aspirationalists need not determine the specific
conceptions of free speech that animated Americans in 1791 or 1868, or whether
those conceptions had evolved during those years. The Fourteenth Amendment
protects free speech if the concept "privileges and immunities" or "due process" is
" See id. at 362 (quoting U.S. Sen. Jacob Howard).
'00 Id. at 358.
o' Id. at 364.
102 The leading works of aspirational constitutional theory include SOTIRIOS A. BARBER,
ON WHAT THE CoNsTrruTION MEANS (1984); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1977); GARY J. JACOBSOHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE DECLINE OF
CONSTrrTrIONAL ASPIRATION (1986); RICHARD S. MARKOVrrs, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE:
LEGITIMATE LEGAL ARGUMENT AND CONSTrrTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1998); MICHAEL
J. PERRY, THE CONSTTUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
J03 DwORKiN, supra note 102, at 134-36.
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best understood as encompassing free speech. The First and Fourteenth
Amendments protect antislavery and analogous speech if free speech is best
understood as encompassing such advocacy.
The relationship between 1791 and 1868 is more complicated for constitutional
interpreters who believe the specific conceptions of the persons responsible for
constitutional provisions matter. Curtis makes a strong, probably compelling, case
that by 1868 a consensus had been reached that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated
the First Amendment. 0 4 Republicans assumed that nationalizing the Bill of Rights
would prevent state governments from passing bans on advocacy analogous to the
Alien and Sedition Acts. No consensus existed, however, in 1798 that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were constitutional. Curtis fairly details the variety of Federalists
arguments made in defense of those measures.'0° Time may have discredited those
arguments. Nevertheless, they provide good reason for thinking that the Alien and
Sedition Acts were consistent with the dominant legal understandings of free speech
in 179 1. Republicans, in short, may have been mistaken when they claimed that the
First Amendment prohibited regulation of antislavery speech, at least if the First
Amendment is interpreted consistently with certain prominent strands of thought in
1791. This mistake has ramifications for both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Republicans attempted to provide a national standard of civil
liberties, to require states to adhere to the standards set out in the First Amendment,
and to guarantee that neither state nor federal officials could ban antislavery or
analogous speech. Originalist premises suggest one of these three purposes cannot
be achieved. The theoretical question is which purpose an originalist should toss.
These potential conflicts between the Constitutions of 1791 and 1868 transcend
free speech. Prominent constitutional histories suggest that American
understandings of many fundamental rights evolved between ratification and
Reconstruction. Several scholars maintain that the constitutional meaning of the
Establishment Clause changed substantially between 1791 and 1868.'06 Various
state supports for religion thought constitutional when the Constitution was ratified
were uniformly thought unconstitutional by the Civil War.0 7 Akhil Reed Amar
maintains that popular understandings of the Second Amendment evolved during
104 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 325-26.
'os Id. at 63-94.
'06 See AMAR, THE BILLOFRIGHTS, supra note 38, at 41-42, 246-57; JESSE H. CHOPER,
SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 3-4 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the
Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085,
1100-36 (1995); Michael J. Mannheimer, EqualProtection Principles and theEstablishment
Clause: Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69 TEMP. L. REv. 95,
104-08 (1996).
I07 AMAR, THE BILLOF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 253-54; Lash, supra note 106, at 1133-
35.
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the first seventy years of constitutional life.'"8 Other commentators insist the due
process acquired substantive meanings between 1791 and 1868.' 9 The Fourteenth
Amendment declares "no state shall deny... the equal protection of the laws,"
rather than "neither the federal nor state governments shall deny" because
Republicans believed, perhaps wrongly, that the Constitution of 1787 already
forbade federal action that violated equal protection. No one in 1868 advanced a
coherent or even an incoherent justification for holding states to higher standards
than the federal government.
Amar insists that the fundamental philosophy underlying the Constitution of
1868 differed considerably from the spirit of 1791. "0 His work claims that the
persons responsible for the Bill of Rights were primarily interested in securing
majoritarian government, while the persons responsible for the Reconstruction
Amendments were primarily concerned with protecting (local) minorities. "' To the
extent Amar is right, the constitutional meaning of every provision of the Bill of
Rights had evolved to some extent between 1791 and 1868. Unless these two
constitutional orders are reconciled, Americans may find themselves governed by
a schizophrenic constitution.
1. The Fourteenth Amendment and 1791
Justice Clarence Thomas focuses almost entirely on what constitutional rights
meant in 1791 when discussing claims that states have violated fundamental
liberties. His opinions frequently do not even indicate that the source of such
claims is the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Bill of Rights. When discussing
whether prisoners in state penitentiaries have a right to conditions of their
confinement that do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, Justice Thomas's
dissent began by declaring: "At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the
word 'punishment' referred to the penalty imposed for the commission of a
crime."' " That opinion made no reference to those constitutional understandings
that might have animated the Reconstruction Constitution." 3 Justice Thomas
similarly ignored 1868 when in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission"' he
declared, "what is important is whether the Framers in 1791 believed anonymous
speech sufficiently valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights."' 5 His
'01 AMAR, THE BILLOF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 258.
"09 John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV.
493, 553-54 (1997); see also GILLMAN, supra note 64, at 19-60.
1"0 AMAR, supra note 38, at xiii.
".. See id. at xiv-xv.
"2 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 38 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 38-40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
114 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
"' Id. at 370 (Thomas, J. concurring).
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lengthy analysis neither discussed constitutional understandings after the Civil War,
nor even indicated that the Fourteenth Amendment is the source of a constitutional
claim against state violations of free speech."' This performance is particularly
remarkable. In the same case, Justice Scalia made clear in several places that
originalists must consider the status of anonymous expression "in 1791 or in
1868.""'
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment using 1791 standards is indefensible,
unless no significant changes occurred between 1791 and 1868 in the dominant
understanding of fundamental constitutional rights. The persons responsible for the
Reconstruction Constitution were trying to prevent the sort of rights violations that
took place in the South before and immediately after the Civil War. Nationalizing
the Bill of Rights was the means to this end, not an end of itself. The common
understanding of "privileges and immunities" in 1868 may well have been "the
rights we and the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1791 think
fundamental." Still, given that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended both to
outlaw Black Codes and support federal legislation, "I the text should be interpreted
as having the meaning necessary to achieve those ends, unless the language of the
text makes doing so impossible. Aspirationalists and originalists may debate
whether the privileges and immunities clause should be interpreted as
constitutionalizing the best understanding of the privileges and immunities or what
persons in 1868 thought was the best understanding of privileges and immunities.
The Reconstruction Republicans cannot plausibly be understood as
constitutionalizing rejected understandings of the privileges and immunities of
United States citizens.
1868 is only a reference point for determining the original meaning of language
used in 1868. Justice William Brennan was a better originalist than Justice Thomas
when, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,"9 he took account of
changes in the dominant conception of freedom of religion before the Civil War.
Brennan noted the suggestion, "with some support in history, that absorption of the
First Amendment's ban against congressional legislation 'respecting an
establishment of religion' is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the
Establishment Clause also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the
existing official state churches."'20 The original meaning of the First Amendment,
however, was not necessarily the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
After noting that "the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved more
116 Id. at 359-70 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"7 Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
11 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 251-61 (1988).
"' 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
20 Id. at 254 (Brennan, J. concurring).
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than three decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified," Justice Brennan
concluded that, "[a]ny such objective of the First Amendment ha[d] become
historical anachronism by 1868 ... ."" Commentators agree that Fourteenth
Amendment rights must be interpreted by mid-nineteenth century standards."'
Hans Baade declares: "To the extent that original 'intent' or 'understanding' are
material under rules of constitutional hermeneutics presently prevailing, the
'crucial' date for the interpretation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is 1868, the year in which it was enacted."'2
2. The Bill of Rights in 1868
The more difficult issue is how provisions of the Bill of Rights ought to be
interpreted in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. The persons responsible for the
post-Civil War Constitution intended to establish a uniform standard of fundamental
rights that would prevent both state and national officials from suppressing
antislavery and analogous speech. The provision they choose - "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States"'24 - clearly expressed their intention to change the
constitutional powers of state governments. The words "no state" also apparently
expressed an intention not to alter the constitutional powers of the national
government. The national government in 1791, however, may have had the power
to suppress antislavery and analogous speech.' The post-Civil War Constitution
could secure all Republican goals only if the Fourteenth Amendment or some
previous circumstance had so changed the meaning of the First Amendment that
national officials who may have had the power to pass the Alien and Sedition Acts
in 1798 no longer had that power by or after 1868.
The very limited commentary is divided on whether the meaning of the First
Amendment changed by or after 1868. Michael Doff insists that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not amend any provision of the Bill of Rights. "[J]ust as the
original 'Second Amendment did not enact the background understanding' circa
1791," he writes, "neither did the Fourteenth Amendment... enact the background
understanding circa 1868."' "26 Amar disagrees. He thinks "the Fourteenth
Amendment has a doctrinal 'feedback effect' against the federal government,
'21 Id. at 255 (Brennan, J., concurring).
12 CURTIS, supra note 50, at 2-4; NELSON, supra note 94, at 2-5.
123 Hans W. Baade, "Original Intent" in Historical Perspective: Some Critical Glosses,
69 TEX. L. REv. 1001, 1025 n.150 (1991).
124 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
125 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
126 Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 291,328 (2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAELC. DORF,
ON READING THE CONSTrTUTION 25 (1991)).
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despite the amendment's clear textual limitation to state action."' 27 "[T]he parallel
language between the First Amendment and the Fourteenth," Amar declares,
"should strongly incline us toward a unitary theory of freedom of speech against
both state and federal governments."'28 Bruce Ackerman takes a similar position,
claiming that the Bill of Rights should be interpreted consistently with the
principles underlying the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 9 Laurence Tribe suggests that
persons "comfortable with the 'time travel' ... [might] treat[] the history of the late
1860s as somehow changing the meaning of a constitutional provision ratified in
1789. '' 3° Tribe has some sympathy for constitutional time travel:
A revision to avoid conflicts with new constitutional text occurs when a
constitutional amendment so alters the rest of the Constitution that, upon
referring back to the constitutional provision in question, we are bound -
unless we are satisfied with a Constitution that merely collects
contradictions - to recognize a revision in that constitutional provision
even if the amendment did not in so many words decree a change in that
provision's words.'
Still, no constitutional contradiction would be created by holding state and
federal officials to different standards when protecting fundamental rights. Many
justifications of two-tiered protections exist.'32 The constitutional problem is that
the persons responsible for the Constitution of 1868 do not appear to have intended
to establish a two-tiered system for protecting fundamental rights. They used "no
state" only because they were convinced the federal government was already
obligated to respect their proposed standard of fundamental rights.'33
The Republican assumption in 1868 that the First Amendment did not need
alteration supports claims that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted as
at least influencing the First Amendment. The consensual constitutional
understandings at one time typically have reasonable constitutional foundations.
Persons in 1868 were unlikely to regard as uncontroversial interpretations of the
127 AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 243.
128 Id. at 244.
129 Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 517,
537 (1989).
130 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 902 n.221 (3d ed. 2000).
131 Id. at 67.
.32 See, e.g., Russell N. Watterson, Jr., Note, Adarand Constructors v. Pena: Madisonian
Theory as a Justification for Lesser Constitutional Scrutiny of Federal Race-Conscious
Legislation, 1996 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 301, 318-25 (discussing historical and textual support for
differentiations between state and federal equal protection).
133 Mark A. Graber, A Constitutional Conspiracy Unmasked: Why "No State" Does Not
Mean "No State," 10 CONST. COMMENT. 87 (1993).
[Vol. 10:3
ANTEBELLUM PERSPECTIVES ON FREE SPEECH
Constitution of 1791 that had no historical grounding. Plausible arguments were
made in 1798 that the Alien and Sedition Acts were unconstitutional, the most
famous being the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.'34 The problem from the
perspective of 1791 is that, in 1798, equally plausible arguments could be made that
the Alien and Sedition Acts were constitutional. Rather than interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment as changing the meaning of the First Amendment, the better
interpretation may be that the Fourteenth Amendment helped settle the meaning of
the First Amendment. Reconstruction Republicans constitutionalized one plausible
interpretation of the antebellum Constitution while rejecting what had previously
been an alternative plausible interpretation of that text.
These attempts to achieve a synthesis between the Constitutions of 1791 and
1868 adopt a fairly traditional view of constitutional change. 1 " The meaning of the
Constitution changes only when a constitutional amendment is passed or, perhaps,
when the Supreme Court hands down a constitutional decision. Given that virtually
no relevant Supreme Court decisions were handed down on the constitutional
meaning of the Bill of Rights between 1791 and 1868, Tribe and Amar assume that
1868 was the only time the constitutional meaning of free speech could have
changed. "Feedback" may occur only when a constitutional amendment is ratified.
Amar and others treat the free speech fights from ratification to Reconstruction as
constitutionally significant only to the extent those controversies influenced
Republican understandings of free speech in 1868. Had the post-Civil War
amendments not been ratified, the controversies documented in The People's
Darling Privilege would apparently be of no constitutional importance.
Constitutional settlements reached outside of courts, this conventional wisdom
suggests, are constitutionally authoritative only when implicitly embodied in a
constitutional amendment specifically intended to resolve some other constitutional
matter.
Tying previous constitutional settlements outside of courts to subsequent
constitutional amendments on related issues creates constitutional paradoxes.
Constitutional settlements on some questions are held hostage to constitutional
settlements on other questions. Suppose a general consensus exists that state
segregation laws are unconstitutional, but that no consensus exists as to the
constitutionality of federal segregation laws. Three parties strive for political
power. The furst party pledges to pass a constitutional amendment declaring "the
federal government will not deny to any person the equal protection of the laws."
The second party pledges to pass a constitutional amendment declaring "the federal
government will have the power to deny to any person the equal protection of the
laws." The third party pledges to pass no constitutional amendment. One party
wins decisive victory and successfully implements its constitutional vision. Fifteen
t CURTIS, supra note 2, at 75-76.
'3 Ackerman, supra note 129, at 517.
20021
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
years later, historical studies demonstrate that the persons responsible for the
Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to prohibit state segregation laws. Whether
this new information influences state power to segregate, according to "feedback"
and "time travel" understandings of constitutional change, depends on whether
either constitutional amendment on federal power to segregate was ratified. Both
proposed amendments presumed that state segregation laws were unconstitutional.
Hence, Amar might interpret both amendments as either amending the Fourteenth
Amendment or settling the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. If, however,
neither constitutional amendment was ratified, the unamended Fourteenth
Amendment remains the appropriate source for determining the constitutionality of
state segregation statutes. States retain the power to segregate, at least according
to originalism, because that was the original understanding in 1868. Whether the
Constitution bans state segregation thus depends entirely on whether at a time when
people think the Constitution bans segregation, they pass a constitutional
amendment, any constitutional amendment, that might be thought to assume state
segregation is unconstitutional. Civil rights supporters in this constitutional
universe gain more when an amendment permitting the federal government to
segregate is ratified than when that amendment is defeated.
Antebellum constitutional practices prevented holding some constitutional
meanings hostage to theoretically unrelated constitutional meanings by infusing
ordinary constitutional politics with constitutional significance. James Madison
recognized political practice was necessary to settle many constitutional questions.
Such settlements required evidence of a national consensus, but that consensus need
not be embodied in a constitutional amendment. Madison declared: "All new laws
.. are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be
liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and
adjudications."' 36 These "discussions and adjudications" need not bejudicial. Four
years before the Supreme Court handed down McCulloch v. Maryland,131 President
Madison declared that the constitutionality of the national bank had been
established by "a concurrence of the general will of the nation."' 3 Constitutional
practice before the Civil War recognized that "a concurrence of the general will of
the nation" at one time could be overruled by "a concurrence of the general will of
the nation" at another time. Just as a series of legislative and executive actions
established the constitutionality of the national bank in 1815,131 so a series of
subsequent legislative and executive actions established the unconstitutionality of
136 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
117 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
238 James Madison, Veto Message (Jan. 30, 1815), in 1 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 555 (James D. Richardson ed., 1896)
[hereinafter MESSAGES].
139 See id.
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the bank by 1850."4
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights are best interpreted as having
incorporated the constitutional changes that took place between 1791 and 1868,
rather than as a synthesis of distinct constitutional understandings in 1791 and 1868.
The post-Civil War Constitution makes sense only when interpreted in light of
constitutional developments on civil liberties matters that took place from
ratification until the Civil War. These constitutional developments included the
emergence of a general consensus after 1800 that the First Amendment was not
limited to preventing prior restraints and that the Alien and Sedition Acts were
unconstitutional.' 4' The general consensus that the First Amendment protected
speech analogous to antislavery advocacy did not include a further consensus on
what speech was analogous to antislavery advocacy. Hence, the meaning of both
the First and Fourteenth Amendments remained unsettled at the time they were
framed. As Madison knew, the post-Civil War Constitution would require
"particular discussions and adjudications" before more general free speech
principles could emerge. 42 Still, treating the Reconstruction amendments as
incorporating previous constitutional settlements outside of courts explains how
Republicans could, without contradiction, nationalize free speech protections, hold
state governments to First Amendment standards, and protect speech analogous to
antislavery advocacy. The Fourteenth Amendment is coherent only when Section
One is interpreted as obligating states to respect what the First Amendment had
come to mean by 1860, and not what that amendment might have meant in 1791.
Prominent constitutional scholars are acknowledging that constitutional
settlements outside of courts should have normative constitutional significance.
Keith Whittington has done an extensive study of the general structure of
constitutional debates outside of courts and the particular characteristics of four
prominent constitutional matters settled almost entirely without judicial help.'43
Whittington observes: "Constitutional constructions [by elected officials] allow
change in the effective meaning of the constitutional text, they are not analogous to
textual amendments."'" The political precedents established by constitutional
decisions outside the courts function similarly to legal precedents established by
judicial decisions inside the courts. Whittington notes: "Constructions remain
binding on future political actors, even if they are not legally enforceable."' 45 Barry
"4 See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 MESSAGES, supra note 138,
at 576, 581-82.
'4' See supra notes 16-17, 20-21 and accompanying text.
142 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
143 See generally WHrrrINGTON, supra note 22; Keith E. Whittington, Presidential
Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY
365 (2001).
144 WHrIINGTON, supra note 22, at 218.
145 id.
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Friedman and Scott Smith reject interpretive practices that limit constitutional
exegesis to the intentions of those responsible for specific constitutional provisions.
"[H]istory is essential to interpretation of the Constitution, but the relevant history
is not just that of the Founding, it is that of all American constitutional history."'6
They particularly emphasize that "[w]hen mining our history, we need to look to the
actions and positions of constitutional actors ranging well beyond the courts.'
' 47
Most famously, Bruce Ackerman and other constitutional scholars highlight those
constitutional moments in American history when various political actors were able
to change constitutional meanings without using the formal constitutional
amendment process. While Ackerman has primarily been interested in exploring
thejurisprudential significance of such grand constitutional moments as ratification,
reconstruction and the New Deal, he recognizes the possibility of mini-
constitutional moments in which political actors achieve smaller constitutional
changes through legislative, executive, or other political means.14
8
Investigations of the Constitution outside of the courts could be sharpened by
looking for what Madison appropriately called "a concurrence of the general will
of the nation."'149 This concurrence may come at a particular decisive moment or
may be the product of evolution."0 All branches of government, as well as such
governing institutions as political parties, may participate in the development of
these settlements. The best sign of a concurrence may be acceptance of some policy
by the leading opposition party. President Clinton's claim that "[t]he era of big
government is over'ls may be a moment of tremendous significance for the
constitutional status of New Deal arrangements. A decision by the Republican
party to remove pro-life provisions from their party's platform might serve as a de
facto settlement that Roe v. Wade" was correctly decided. The sharp distinction
Whittington draws between constitutional settlements outside of courts, and legal
precedents or constitutional amendments cannot be sustained. What people litigate
and how they amend the Constitution depends on what they think is constitutionally
settled. The Constitution of 1868 makes sense only on the assumption that
significant constitutional issues were settled outside of courts between 1791 and
1868.
Treating political decisions as constitutional precedent prevents the
constitutional deck from being stacked against many claims of individual rights.
The judiciary in the United States only determines the constitutionality of laws
'4 Friedman & Smith, supra note 37, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
147 Id. at 63-64.
149 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 42, at 196.
149 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
"s0 See ACKERMAN, supra note 42, at 196-98.
s ' The State of the Union Address by the President of the United States, 142 CONG. REC.
H768 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996).
1s2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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elected officials pass and executive officials enforce. The justices hear cases on the
constitutionality of the death penalty only after elected officials have passed a bill
punishing some crime by death and a prosecutor persuades legal authorities to
impose capital punishment in a particular case. No government has a judicially
enforceable obligation to punish some crime by death. Hence, no constitutional
issues are raised when elected officials repeal, reject, or never consider bills
imposing capital punishment for some crimes. That the Constitution prohibits
excessive but not lenient punishments means that the Supreme Court is far more
likely to hear a case raising the constitutionality of the death penalty when most
elected officials believe the death penalty constitutional than when most elected
officials believe the death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. Elected
officials, the evidence further suggests, try to appoint, and are usually successful in
their efforts to secure,justices who agree with their constitutional understandings. '53
Thus, good reasons exist for thinking that the constitutionality of the death penalty
is more likely to come before justices inclined to think the death penalty
constitutional than justices inclined to think the death penalty unconstitutional.
The constitutional status of the national bank vividly illustrates the way an
emphasis on judicial precedents may bias constitutionalism. From 1788 until 1828,
national majorities generally favored the establishment of a national bank.'"
Throughout most of this period, a national bank existed whose constitutionality
could be challenged. Several challenges reached the Supreme Court. InMcCulloch
v. Maryland' and Osborn v. Bank of the United States,"6 the Supreme Court ruled
that the federal government had the power to incorporate a national bank. From
1828 until 1860, national majorities generally opposed the establishment of a
national bank.' 7 Presidents Jackson 5 ' and Tyler'59 each vetoed a bank bill. By the
end of the Mexican War in 1848, Whigs had abandoned all legislative efforts to
reinstate national banking." In the absence of a national bank whose
constitutionality might have been challenged, the Supreme Court after 1832 had no
opportunity to reconsider McCulloch. Had a Jacksonian tribunal considered the
matter, good reason exists for thinking the bank would have been declared
" See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 60-92 (1985).
'54 See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO
THE CIVIL WAR 144-71,251-325 (1957).
1 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
156 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
157 See HAMMOND, supra note 154, at 326-717.
58 See supra note 140.
'5 John Tyler, Veto Message (Aug. 16, 1841), in 4 MESSAGES, supra note 138, at 63.
"6 See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
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unconstitutional. 6 '
'61 By the end of Jackson's second term, political sentiment in Washington was that
McCulloch would be overruled whenever the Taney Court was presented with a proper case.
Thomas Hart Benton praised President Jackson on the Senate floor for "prepar[ing] the way
for a reversal of that decision." Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in
Constitutional Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 205, 249 (1999) (quoting 13 CONG. DEB. 387 (1837)
(statement of Sen. Benton)) (emphasis deleted). Daniel Webster in 1841 warned Whig
associates in Congress that the Supreme Court would almost certainly declare
unconstitutional any bank bill similar to the one sustained by the Marshall Court in
McCulloch. See MERRILLD. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN 306 (1987). Reverdy Johnson, a leading Democrat and member of the Supreme
Court bar, was similarly "convinced that the Court would declare that it would be
unconstitutional to establish a branch [of the national] bank in a state that had specifically
refused to sanction it." NORMA LOIS PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY
HARRISON AND JOHN TYLER 70 (1989). See generally Magliocca, supra at 226, 248-50.
These predictions were quite realistic given the composition of the Supreme Court. As
Representative Henry Wise noted, if the Whig Congress entertained hopes of rechartering
the Bank of the United States, it should consider the composition of the Supreme Court, and
then ask itself "if the distinguished gentleman, who removed the public deposites from the
Bank of the United States [Taney] was not at the head of it, and if a majority of its members,
was not of that school of politicians, who believed a Bank of the United States
unconstitutional?" Magliocca, supra at 254 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess.
app. at 299 (1841) (statement of Rep. Wise)) (alteration in original). Before joining the
Court, Roger Taney, Levi Woodbury, James Wayne, Philip Pendleton Barbour, John
McKinley, Nathan Clifford, and John Catron all played prominent roles in Jacksonian fights
against the national bank and American system. Taney and Woodbury were trusted members
of Jackson's cabinet, TIMOTHY L. HALL, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL
DICTIONARY 91 (200 1) (discussing Taney); id. at I 16-17 (discussing Woodbury), Woodbury
was in Van Buren's cabinet, HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 99 (1974), and
Clifford was the attorney general in the Polk Administration. HALL, supra at 133. Woodbury
received serious consideration as a possible Jacksonian presidential candidate, id. at 117;
Barbour was almost the Jacksonian nominee for the vice-presidency in 1832. Id. at 97.
Woodbury, Wayne, Barbour, McKinley, and Clifford were Jacksonian leaders in Congress.
Id. at 116 (discussing Woodbury); id. at 87 (discussing Wayne); id. at 96-97 (discussing
Barbour); id. at 104 (discussing McKinley); id. at 133 (discussing Clifford). Henry
Baldwin, Taney, Catron, McKinley, and Peter V. Daniel played major roles organizing
Jacksonian forces in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama, and Virginia
respectively. ABRAHAM, supra at 89 (discussing Baldwin); id. at 90 (discussing Taney); id.
at 93-94 (discussing Catron); id. at 95 (discussing McKinley); id. at 95-96 (discussing
Daniel). The judicial majority on the Taney Court was either on record as believing
McCulloch wrongly decided or virtually on record as harboring such sentiments. Five Taney
Court justices, Chief Justice Roger Taney, Justices Philip Pendleton Barbour, Peter Daniel,
Nathan Clifford, and Levi Woodbury had, while in political office, declared that the national
bank was unconstitutional. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess., app. at 180 (1841)
(Woodbury); CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., I st Sess., app. at 475 (1840) (Clifford); 39 ANNALS
OFCONG. 1221 (1820) (Barbour); JOHNP. FRANK, JUSTICEDANIELDISSENTING 113 (1964);
CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 190-95, 345 (1935). The other orthodox
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McCulloch standing alone gives an unbalanced picture of the antebellum
constitutional universe. The Jacksonian majority that successfully attacked the
bank for thirty years will enjoy the same constitutional significance as the
National Republican majority that successfully incorporated the bank for thirty
years only when Jackson's veto is given the same constitutional significance as
McCulloch.
The constitutional status of free speech before the Civil War is subject to the
same biased interpretation when only judicial decisions are considered. We know
that Federalist justices thought the Alien and Sedition Acts constitutional.
Federalist justices sat on the bench when the constitutionality of the Alien and
Sedition Acts was legally challenged, and sustained those measures. We do not
know whether Jeffersonian or Jacksonian justices thought the Alien and Sedition
Acts constitutional. When Jeffersonian and Jacksonianjustices were on the bench,
Jeffersonian and Jacksonian officials in the elected branches of the national
government refused to re-enact those or analogous measures. The justices most
likely to think the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional had no opportunity to
Jacksonian members of the Taney Court were either leading opponents of the national bank,
see ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 72 (1943);
Letter from Justice Catron to Ex-President Andrew Jackson (Feb. 5, 1838), in WALTER
CHANDLER, THE CENTENARY OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE JOHN CATRON OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 28, 29 (1937); Edwin Countryman, Samuel Nelson, 19 GREEN BAG 329
(1907); John M. Martin, John McKinley: Jacksonian Phase, 28 ALA. HIST. Q. 7, 25-27
(1966), or identified with political factions or political leaders that regarded the bank as
unconstitutional. SWISHER, supra at 444 (discussing the nomination of Robert Grier to the
Supreme Court, and his opposition to the Bank of the United States); Christine Jordan, Last
of the Jacksonians, 1980 Sup. CT. HIST. SOC'Y Y.B. 78, 80 (discussing Justice John
Campbell and his opposition to rechartering the Bank of the United States). Only five
justices who sat during the Taney era could be counted on as relatively sure votes for
sustaining the national bank. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(fimding unanimously, including Justice Joseph Story, that the Bank of the United States was
constitutional); United States v. Shive, 27 F. Cas. 1065, 1067 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) (Justice
James Baldwin); 1 MEMOIROF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS 115 (Benjamin R. Curtis, Jr., ed.,
Da Capo Press 1970) (1879); DONALD MALCOLM ROPER, MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON AND THE
CONSTTUTION 296 (1987) (Justice Smith Thompson); Letters of John McLean to John
Teesdale, BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, Oct. 1899, at 720 (Justice McLean). At no time did these
five justices sit together.
Taney Court justices who fought the bank on constitutional grounds in the national
legislature or national executive might nevertheless have thought the Court lacked the power
to strike down a law authorizing the national bank. Still, the most probable swing votes on
that question from 1845 to 1860, Justices Wayne and Catron, were militant opponents of the
bank who retained strong Jacksonian political connections. Two other swing justices,
Justices Grier and Nelson, exhibited no such judicial modesty after the Civil War when
declaring that the government had no power to make paper money legal tender for private
debts. Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).
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consider the matter because their national political sponsors were more protective
of speech than the Federalist officials who repressed political dissent during the
1790s.
The legal history of the Alien and Sedition Acts demonstrates that narrow legal
traditions may not quite coexist with protective popular traditions. Legal free
speech traditions result only at times when political officials repress political
dissent. When proponents of a popular protective free speech tradition control the
elected branches of government, no legal tradition of any sort can develop. No laws
are passed that might be judicially challenged. If constitutional scholars insist,
therefore, on privileging legal traditions when interpreting the Constitution, they
will be primarily privileging constitutional practices at those times when elected
officials are repressing rather than permitting political dissent.
Em. CONCLUSION
Curtis has written a wonderful book on free speech theory and practice from the
Bill of Rights to the Reconstruction. That other works can and will be published
on this subject matter hardly diminishes his magnificent achievement. Scholars
who wish to write about constitutional politics before the Civil War, general
problems of constitutional interpretation, or other matters that require some
knowledge of antebellum free speech practice will find The People's Darling
Privilege a rich store of vital insights. A review discussing the books the author did
not write must at least graciouslY conclude that these books can now be written only
because of the book the author actually did write.
This review was published too late to incorporate the subtle assaults on free
speech that took place during the first weeks after the despicable assaults on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon. No curbs have been placed on political
dissent, and the possibility of substantial violations of First Amendment rights
presently seems remote. Nevertheless, recent events highlight all the distinctive
flaws Curtis observes afflicting contemporary free speech practice. The
"increasingly concentrated mass medium of television"'62 has uniformly celebrated
national unity and called for an end to all bickering. Americans are subject to
constant "United We Stand" messages whenever they watch television, listen to the
radio, read a newspaper, or even drive down the highway. Rarely have the
mainstream media indicated that issues are being debated or are even subject to
debate. Our enemies, both President Bush and most public commentators agree,
must be defeated militarily and cannot be persuaded by argument that their cause
is unjust.
The abolitionists whom Curtis celebrates felt differently about the relative
merits of war and argumentation as means to combat evil. Many distinguished
162 CURTIS, supra note 2, at 415.
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antebellum opponents of slavery professed pacifism and maintained that moral
suasion was the only legitimate response to injustice.'63 Lincoln would prove that
war is sometimes an effective response to human depravity, though the failures of
Reconstruction were in large part the result of efforts to impose justice by force of
arms. "  Perhaps military strikes against terrorism will prove as effective as the
Union effort during the Civil War. History, however, suggests that might makes
right only accidentally. Free speech is a central element of a faith system
committed to thinking human beings in the long run as capable of recognizing
justice, even when justice does not serve their immediate interest. War recognizes
no such logic. Persuading those who oppose us as whole heartedly as jihadic
warriors may seem a quixotic philosophical fantasy. The hard reality is that the
human race will soon become extinct if war continues to be an alternative to talk.
163 See AILEEN S. KRADrrOR, MEANS AND ENDS IN AMERICAN ABOLITIONISM 78-102
(1969).
'6 See MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 208 (1998) ("[A]chieving a genuine reconstitution would have
required, in some fashion, the acquiescence of the vanquished South."). Claiming that
southerners in 1868 might have been persuaded to the positions presently held by the
NAACP is utter nonsense. The point is that racial justice will likely be achieved in the long
run only when most persons are persuaded that racial justice must be done.
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